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Abstract
In the 1970s, there were many reports of toxic hazards at corporate subsidiaries in the developing world that were
no longer tolerated in the corporations’ “home” countries. Following the chemical disaster in Bhopal, India, in 1984,
leading corporations then announced that they applied uniform standards of worker and environmental protection
worldwide. With globalization, corporations should also be obliged to take responsibility for their separate supplier,
contractor and distributor companies, and licensees of their technology.
The asbestos industry today consists of national corporations. Individual countries must overcome the influence of
the asbestos-exporting countries and asbestos companies and stop building with asbestos, as recommended by
WHO, ILO, and World Bank. WHO precautions for limiting governmental interaction with the tobacco industry
should be applied in dealing with the asbestos industry.
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Background
The environmental movement in some industrialized
nations in the 1970s brought unprecedented pressures
on the most hazardous and polluting industries. Media
coverage and public awareness led to the enactment of
laws and the implementation of governmental regula-
tions on chemical and asbestos industries, among
others. Companies opposing regulation protested that
they would face ruinous competition from unregulated
foreign competitors.
But not all the “foreign competition” was foreigners
or competitors. All that Amatex, a US asbestos textile
company, needed to do to avoid regulation of its manu-
facturing process, was to move its production just
across the Mexican border [1]. Japan’s Kawasaki Steel
built a sintering plant in Mindanao, in the Philippines,
in the mid-1970s. This steelmaking process produced
vast amounts of air pollution including trace metal
impurities from the iron ore, coke and iron ore dust,
and oxides of sulfur and nitrogen. A Manila newspaper
reported that it was a “dirty” industry that could not be
built in Japan because of pollution concerns, but “the
Philippine authorities have no objection to its installa-
tion in the under-polluted southern island.” [1].
In the 1970s, there developed a growing concern about
the export of hazardous industries to the developing
world and about the responsibility of global corporations
for transferring protective safeguards along with the
industrial processes, products, and wastes. Today, global
corporations still dominate manufacturing and trade, but
they often manage this through arrangements with
separate companies rather than through their corporate
subsidiaries. This complicates the challenge of getting
global corporations to improve rather than exploit
hazardous conditions in the developing world.
Before regulation of hazardous US industries caused
international flight
Hueper wrote in a 1949 US government monograph that
asbestos and a number of chemicals were carcinogenic.
He warned that with the growth of industry in the devel-
oping world, “The bad record, carcinogenically speaking,
which resulted from the hurried development of large-
scale chemical industries during and following World
War I may be repeated.” He also wrote that, “Criminal
codes should take cognizance of the fact that the willful
and undue exposure of an individual to a carcinogenic
occupational agent for personal gain by another party is
for all practical purposes equivalent to an attack with a
deadly weapon with a delayed action mechanism.” [2].
Despite the accumulating scientific literature demon-
strating the carcinogenicity and other chronic effects of
major industrial chemicals, there was minimal regulation
of industry anywhere in the world before the 1970s.
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Trade unions and workers were generally unaware of
delayed health effects and the body of knowledge about
them. Large corporations employed physicians and
industrial hygienists who were aware of the literature,
but these health professionals worked for corporate
management. They usually had no authority to order im-
proved industrial ventilation or to even tell workers that
materials they were exposed to could cause specific
forms of cancer.
Even when workers developed occupational diseases,
particularly long-delayed conditions such as occupa-
tional cancer and pneumoconioses, they rarely became
aware of their work as the cause of their disability. In
earlier decades and into the 1970s, company doctors
examining workers and seeing asbestosis on their chest
X-rays failed to tell the workers. It was corporate policy
(DuPont, Bethlehem Steel, Johns-Manville) [3].
Under these conditions of virtually no information, no
regulation, and no compensation, well-established mortal
hazards continued to be widespread and uncontrolled.
When industry protested the requirements of a workers’
compensation law in New York in 1935, securing weaken-
ing provisions, the companies threatened to move to other
states, not other countries [3]. Workers’ compensation
laws alone did little to get industry to make expenditures
to prevent occupational diseases. Before 1970, there wasn’t
much else going on, even to inform, let alone protect US
workers from health hazards whose control would involve
significant costs.
States in the US avoided creating “barriers to indus-
try.” Some states published in their legal codes the
Threshold Limit Values, occupational exposure limits
for toxic agents in the workplace air proposed by a
volunteer committee of a professional association. But
these limits were recommended as good practice
guidelines and were not enforced at all by state health
and labor officials. Enforcement would have required
financing the state agencies to have laboratories cap-
able of doing air sampling and analyses for hundreds
of substances – and empowering and directing state
inspectors to issue fines for violations. Just as the cor-
porations were unwilling to compete in safety at the
expense of profitability, state governments were un-
willing to compete in safety at the expense of losing
industries and jobs.
The industrial medicine and hygiene establishment
opposed mandatory industrial hygiene codes. At the
1954 meeting of the Industrial Hygiene Foundation,
industry lawyer Theodore Waters said administration of
workplace limits “in a police sense” would be a “tool in
the hands of labor unions.” Harvard professor and cor-
porate consultant Philip Drinker agreed that any codes
should be merely “advisory and not mandatory”, other-
wise they would be “a severe burden on industry and an
unfair one.” None of the company doctors on the panel
or in the audience took exception to this view [4].
Corporate “double standards”
The large-scale export of hazardous industries to the
developing world coincided with the global expansion of
industry and the modern era of regulation in the US and
Europe in the 1970s. Government authorities enforced
new laws to regulate airborne exposure to toxic sub-
stances at work and pollution in the environment. Most
of the new industry set up in the developing world was
just the global expansion of business-as-usual, but some
was the selective export of ultra-hazardous, discredited
technologies. Major “runaway industry” shifts occurred
in relatively few cases, such as manufacture of asbestos
textiles and benzidine dyes, and the recovery of arsenic
as a by-product of smelting certain copper ores [1].
The larger problem was corporate “double standards”
in industrial hazards that emerged as industries faced
regulation and liability in the most industrialized na-
tions, driven by growing awareness of workers and the
public about the disease threat from certain industrial
air contaminants and water pollutants. These restrictions
were absent in the developing world where rapid indus-
trial expansion was occurring. When challenged, the
multinational corporations could come up with no justi-
fication for exposing people in some countries to more
of these poisons than was allowed in the countries where
they were based. They made claims about having no
double standards, but these claims were frequently in-
capable of withstanding scrutiny of the corporate subsid-
iaries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa [5].
Largely revealed in scattered newspaper and magazine
articles, corporate double standards were reported in many
countries, in many industrial processes: dye manufacture,
numerous asbestos product manufacturing industries,
trichlorophenol and chromate manufacture, mercury-cell
chlorine manufacture, steelmaking, polyvinyl chloride
manufacture, arsenical pesticide manufacture, and poly-
chlorinated biphenyl waste disposal [5]. An International
Labor Office study concluded that, in comparing the health
and safety performance of home country and foreign
subsidiary operations of multinational corporations, “it
could be generally said that the home country operations
were better than those of the subsidiaries in developing
countries” [6].
The United Nations Centre on Transnational Corpora-
tions noted in 1985, “[E]xamples of ‘double standards’ in
worker and environmental protection have been docu-
mented covering a broad range of transnationals, indus-
tries and countries” [7]. The Centre, which began in 1974
and closed in 1992, was the UN’s attempt to focus on the
global corporations and try (in vain) to develop a code of
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practice that global corporations might reasonably be
expected to follow.
The Bhopal Gas tragedy
Then came the chemical disaster in Bhopal, India, in
December of 1984. In a matter of hours, several thousand
people died, many thousands more would succumb later,
and well over 100,000 would be permanently disabled.
The cause was a massive release of 41 metric tons of vola-
tile methyl isocyanate, a chemical so dangerous that large
German and Japanese chemical corporations wouldn’t
even store it in large tanks. Relentless media attention
disclosed striking contrasts between Union Carbide’s
Bhopal plant and another Carbide plant making the same
pesticide in West Virginia.
The double standards at Bhopal included numerous vital
aspects of design and operation, compounded by manage-
ment cut-backs in staffing, worker pay, worker training,
and maintenance of functional process safeguards (e.g.,
refrigeration for MIC storage) in the money-losing pesticide
plant [8, 9].
The worldwide public reaction to the Bhopal disaster led
major chemical corporations to issue global corporate
policy statements in the late 1980s that said in various ways,
“we have no double standards.” These large companies
could thereafter reasonably be expected to demonstrate
that the new projects they propose would be up to the
highest standards they practice anywhere. Specifically, there
are questions a country could justifiably ask a foreign in-
vestor before allowing the construction of a new industrial
plant (e.g., Guidelines for environmental review of indus-
trial projects evaluated by developing countries) [10].
Corporate social responsibility elusive in the era of
globalization
In recent years, globalization has reduced the visibility of
corporate double standards on health, safety, and the
environment. Questions of responsibility become easier to
shirk in a shifting maze of suppliers, contractors, distribu-
tors, and licensees of technology – all separate companies
that are not subsidiaries of the global corporations. Gov-
ernments in the developing world need to identify the for-
eign corporations whose business created the basis for an
application for plant construction filed by a local entrepre-
neur. Only then can the prospective host government
properly investigate the global corporation’s experience
with any hazardous technology involved.
It is tragic that the global chemical and microelectron-
ics corporations neither disclose nor take responsibility
for the behavior of these agents of their profitability
(suppliers, contractors, distributors, licensees) – in the
same way that many of them do for their more easily
identifiable subsidiaries.
A “Code of Sustainable Practice in Occupational and
Environmental Health and Safety for Corporations” was
drafted at a conference on “Dangerous Trade”, with
globalization in mind. The Code is an attempt to hold
the corporations to the highest standard of toxic sub-
stances control they practice anywhere, everywhere; and
it applies to all the corporations’ subsidiaries, suppliers,
contractors, distributors, and licensees [11].
Sweatshop safety accord
The devastating collapse of the Rana Plaza building in
Bangladesh in 2013 killed 1138 garment workers and in-
jured hundreds more. It occurred only months after the
fire at Tazreen Fashion, which caused 112 deaths. As the
names of the well-known brands that these Bangladesh
clothing makers were supplying became public, global
corporations were obliged to create and agree to the
Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety.
The Accord began regular inspections of buildings for
fire, electrical, and structural integrity in February 2014.
The findings are published, including photographs of
hazardous conditions, on the Accord’s website
www.bangladeshaccord.org The Accord will conduct
independent inspections of 1800 factories. More than
150 global brands and retailers have signed the
Accord. The Accord requires brands to pay factories
enough to assure safety, including paying the cost of
repairs immediately after an inspection reveals hazard-
ous conditions. While buildings are closed for the
repairs, the workers are paid. International and
Bangladesh unions are actively involved in the Accord,
as is the International Labor Organization [12].
Walmart and Gap Inc. declined to sign the legally-
binding Accord, opting instead to pursue “voluntary”
programs.
Asbestos
As the result of social movements around the world,
asbestos is banned in over 50 countries. Yet most of the
world’s people live in countries where asbestos is still
used, often with few if any protective measures. Global
consumption since the turn of the new century has
remained at about 2 million tons annually, as some
countries banned asbestos and others increased their use
of it. Over 90% of the asbestos is used in asbestos-
cement sheets and pipes, most for asbestos-cement roof-
ing. Over 85% of world asbestos consumption is in Asia.
The World Health Organization has called for a global
ban of all forms of asbestos and estimated the annual
death toll worldwide at more than 107,000 due to lung
cancer, mesothelioma, and asbestosis from occupational
exposure [13]. Many thousands more die from environ-
mental, non-occupational cancer caused by asbestos,
including the family members in workers’ households
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exposed to dust brought home on the workers’ clothes.
Yet others die from other cancers caused by asbestos –
including laryngeal and ovarian cancer, according to the
International Agency for Research on Cancer [14].
Global corporations can play a constructive role
where their corporate standards are superior to what
may be locally required of them. Companies including
Unilever, Dow, and ICI, like the World Bank [15],
have announced that they have global policies of 1)
not using asbestos materials in constructing new facil-
ities and 2) observing procedural safeguards when
asbestos materials have to be disturbed or demolished
in existing facilities. Public disclosure of the texts of
these corporate policies would be a useful spur to na-
tional companies to do likewise. Such disclosure
would help expand the market for alternatives to
asbestos-cement roofing, increasing demand and low-
ering the price of safer substitutes while supporting
the case for banning asbestos in the country. How-
ever, officials with ICI, Unilever and other global cor-
porations have been reluctant to disclose the texts of
their policies.
Back in the 1970s, many asbestos companies in the
developing world were subsidiaries and customers of
global asbestos corporations. But in the new century,
there are no corporate asbestos giants remaining. The
industry today consists mainly of national companies
in each country, though there may occasionally be
some ownership by foreign companies from asbestos-
mining countries (mainly Russia and Kazakhstan).
The involvement of Russian and Kazakh asbestos in-
terests in Vietnam may play an important role in the
opposition to banning asbestos there.
The asbestos companies of today are run by business-
men who stayed in or got in when the multinational cor-
porations got out. This industry spends millions hiring
scientists to write and publish “downright dishonest sci-
ence” in the literature [16]. The asbestos companies
worldwide are well connected and use the same propa-
ganda and strategies everywhere to minimize their costs
for disease prevention and compensation. In recent
years, doctors raising concerns about asbestos in India,
Thailand, and Brazil have been threatened with legal
action by the asbestos industry.
A multibillionaire asbestos owner-executive, Stephan
Schmidheiny, was sentenced to 18 years in jail for creat-
ing an environmental disaster causing thousands of
deaths from mesothelioma by an Italian trial court and
court of appeal; he only avoided conviction when the
highest court threw the case out on a legal technicality
(crimes prosecuted after the statute of limitations had
run) [17]. A murder case against Schmidheiny is poised
to proceed in 2016, pending a ruling from the Italian
constitutional court.
No other industry has a comparable record of docu-
mented bad practices in occupational and environmental
health. In the US, decades of litigation over asbestos
injury compensation have pried loose a vast number of
internal documents from the asbestos companies. These
corporate documents reveal a veritable encyclopedia of
menacing business practices. The history unearthed has
involved the asbestos industry worldwide, going back to
the 1920s.
This record includes [3, 18, 19]:
– the suppression of medical and experimental
findings
– manipulation of published reports
– suppression of reference to asbestos hazards in the
trade press
– publication of statements and reports by trade
associations that asbestos products are not toxic
– withholding of information on asbestos disease from
governmental authorities
– prolonged violation after regulations required health
warning labels on asbestos products
– marketing of products without warning labels in
some countries after starting to affix warnings on
the same products in other countries
– targeting of doctors raising public awareness about
asbestos hazards
– settlement of damage suits on condition that the
lawyer representing the workers file no more such
cases
– non-disclosure to employees of asbestosis revealed
in their medical examinations
– firing workers and busting unions for protesting
asbestos hazards
– firing and replacing workers before they had time to
develop asbestos diseases from their exposures
– exporting banned asbestos products,
– labeling asbestos-containing products “asbestos-free”
– removing the word “asbestos” in advertising asbestos
products bearing no warnings
– selling asbestos for use in children’s modeling
compounds
– sub-contracting of hazardous asbestos maintenance
work
– wanton disposal of wastes around asbestos factories
– prolonged failure to take basic sanitary precautions
to keep workers from taking asbestos dust home to
their families on their clothes
In the new century, asbestos interests have spent many
millions of dollars contracting and publishing “product
defense” articles to exonerate chrysotile asbestos, the type
of asbestos that accounted for 95 % of world asbestos use
in the 20th century and the only type of asbestos in
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international trade since then [20, 21]. Governments with
close relations with asbestos interests have repeatedly
blocked including chrysotile asbestos under the Rotterdam
Convention’s prior-informed-consent warning require-
ments for widely-banned, hazardous substances in inter-
national trade.
The asbestos industry is making profits from selling
and exporting a deadly product, and in addition to the
human tragedy it is creating, the industry is placing on
the shoulders of individuals, their families, their commu-
nities and their governments the enormous economic
costs of ill health, mortality and contaminated environ-
ments. The asbestos industry should accordingly be
treated by governments the way the World Health
Organization recommends governments treat the to-
bacco industry.
Treating the asbestos industry like the tobacco industry
The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
recognizes the “need to be alert to any efforts by the to-
bacco industry to undermine or subvert tobacco control
efforts” and to take action “to protect (tobacco control)
policies from commercial or other vested interests of the
tobacco industry”[22]. This is based on guiding princi-
ples including Principle 1: “There is a fundamental and
irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco interests and
public health policy interests.” To implement this, WHO
recommends that governments “should interact with the
tobacco industry only when and to the extent strictly
necessary to enable them to effectively regulate the
tobacco industry and tobacco products” [22].
Because of the asbestos industry’s parallel history of
subverting public health policy, similar limitations should
be followed by governments making policy decisions on
asbestos in interacting with the asbestos industry’s repre-
sentatives. Governments should not feel obliged to put up
with endless lobbying, delaying tactics and arguments about
“controlled use” of the killer dust. This is an industry whose
very survival depends on minimizing the expense of pre-
vention and compensation, mediated through links with
politicians, government officials, media, the courts, doctors,
medical institutions, universities, and unionists. Govern-
ments should interact with the asbestos industry only to
the extent necessary to ban new asbestos product use as
quickly as possible and to provide protective measures for
dealing with asbestos products already in place.
Conclusion
The export of hazardous industries to the developing
world is still largely a responsibility of the global corpo-
rations that dominate world trade, and increasingly so
with international trade agreements enabling these gi-
ants to increase their presence in markets worldwide.
The subcontracting of hazardous work has gone global,
with the expansion of hazardous industries, particularly
in Asian countries. Hazardous and polluting industries
operate in collapsing buildings with no safety provisions,
untouched by regulation and liability. If disaster occurs,
it takes an investigation even to determine which foreign
corporations were the customers for the products the
deadly plants were making.
Corporate leaders need to own up to their responsi-
bilities by publicly disclosing the identities of their
suppliers, in particular, and accepting the responsibility
for assuring that suppliers follow the highest standards
of worker and environmental protection – just as the
corporations do for clearly identifiable corporate
subsidiaries. Non-governmental organizations, govern-
ments, and international bodies can take measures to
increase transparency and disclosure of business con-
nections between the giant corporations and their affili-
ates, particularly when tragedies occur.
One industry stands out as a discredited, hazardous
industry that just won’t go away quietly: asbestos. The last
global asbestos company was the French Saint-Gobain,
which decided to sell its Brazilian asbestos mine and
convert its asbestos-cement plant there to non-asbestos
fiber-cement in 1999. But when the global companies got
out, others were there to take over, and Saint-Gobain’s
Brazilian subsidiary faces stiff competition from national
asbestos companies in the states of Brazil where asbestos
has not yet been banned. Similarly, asbestos businesses
started in the past century by foreign corporations have
been taken over by local entrepreneurs in India and many
other countries. National governments need to overcome
the obstruction of the asbestos industry and act on the
knowledge that, as the WHO puts it, “the most efficient
way to eliminate asbestos-related diseases is to stop the use
of all types of asbestos” [23].
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